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ABSTRACT
We study the implications of a particular form of irrationality on the pricing behavior of firms in a
monopolistic-competitive  market  with  incomplete  information.  We  assume  that  firms  are
overconfident, meaning that they over-estimate their abilities to understand the correct model of the
economy. However, we allow firms to obtain information by paying a fixed cost. We find two
important implications: i) overconfident firms are less inclined to acquire information; ii) prices
might exhibit excess volatility driven by non-fundamental disturbances. We use our model to match












New York, NY 10003
anastasios.karantounias@nyu.eduUsing micro data on consumer prices for the U.S. economy, Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2004), hereinafter KK, have documented that prices change frequently with an av-
erage absolute size of 8.5% on a monthly basis and that these frequent movements
are equally likely to be positive or negative in sign. In contrast, aggregate inﬂation
averages just at 0.6% over an horizon of 3 months. This evidence is an important
challenge for modelers of inﬂation dynamics, especially for those who believe that
nominal disturbances can have real and highly persistent eﬀects on output. Indeed,
Golosov and Lucas (2004) have been able to match this empirical evidence with
a model in which pricing decisions are state dependent but subject to a cost of
changing prices. In their model the observed high volatility of prices is explained
by changes driven by highly volatile idiosyncratic productivity shocks. But, no
matter what the source and the size of the other disturbances in the economy, the
pricing decisions are dominated by the occurrence of this idiosyncratic component.
As a consequence, a nominal disturbance has negligible real eﬀects on output since
it mixes up with the idiosyncratic shocks. To counteract this result, Gertler and
Leahy (2005) have shown that even a model with state-dependent pricing can be
consistent with important real eﬀects of nominal disturbances.
In a recent work, Woodford (2002) has renewed interest on an alternative theory
of the real eﬀects of monetary policy that originates from the Phelps (1970) and
Lucas (1972) hypothesis of decisionmakers that have imperfect information on the
nature of the disturbances that aﬀect the economy. The important acumen of his
theory is to observe that it does not really matter whether information is publicly
available or not but what matters is the limited ability of agents to process available
information, as in the rational inattention theory of Sims (2003). The limited
processing ability leads to a “gap between reality and perception” (Woodford, 2002,
p.31), which can be modelled as if agents receive noisy signals about the shocks
of the economy. In particular, the hidden process of the stochastic disturbance
represents the objective “reality”, whereas the signals represent the “subjective
perception” of the decisionmakers (price-setters) and the “gap between reality and
perception” is the diﬀerence between the two.
When there is a “gap between reality and perception” and this gap is idio-
syncratic to each decisionmaker, then an important source of uncertainty is the
“perception” of others together with all their higher-order beliefs on them. The
slow adjustment of higher-order beliefs can produce real eﬀects of a nominal shock
1that are highly persistent. The attractive feature of this theory is that it can justify
unequal adjustments of prices to diﬀerent disturbances for the fact that decision-
m a k e r sc a nb em o r eo rl e s sa t t e n t i v et od i ﬀerent disturbances. Along this line of
reasoning, Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt (2005) have been able to match the above-
mentioned empirical evidence in a model in which price setters have to dichotomize
their attention between an idiosyncratic productivity shock and an aggregate nomi-
nal shock. If the idiosyncratic disturbance is relatively more volatile, then they pay
more attention to it and therefore prices react more to these disturbances. On the
other side, when a nominal and less volatile disturbance perturbs the economy, de-
cisionmakers show rational inattention, which combined with the slow adjustment
of higher-order beliefs can produce highly persistent eﬀects on output.
In the Woodford-Sims theory the “gap between reality and perception” is the
same whether one looks from the “reality” or the “perception” side of the world.
Decisionmakers have limited ability to process information but they are rational
in all other aspects. This assumption ignores the fact that decisionmakers may
exhibit various biases about their subjective perceptions.
We instead depart from a fully rational model. Our aim here is to explain
the excess volatility of prices documented by KK with price movements that fol-
low idiosyncratic non-fundamental noises in contrast with the other contributions
described above.1
In the Woodford-Sims theory, we assume that the “gap between reality and
perception” is smaller when one looks from the “subjective mind” of the deci-
sionmaker than from the objective “reality”. In practice, this translates into a
model in which price setters over-estimate their ability to understand “reality” by
overestimating the precision of their signals. This is overconﬁdence.
That overconﬁdence accords with “reality” is well documented by psycholog-
ical studies. For example, in a simultaneous study of US and Swedish drivers,
88% of the US group and 77% of the Swedish group asked believed that they are
safer drivers than the median (Svenson, 1981), or 90% of 168 federal magistrate
1A documented example is the following. Frozen concentrated orange juice in the US is for
the greatest part produced in Orlando, Florida. The most relevant fundamental variable that
changes on a day-to-day basis is then the weather around Orlando. Roll (1984) has shown that
weather surprises explain only a small fraction of the observed variability in futures prices and
on top of this no other demand or supply factors can be identiﬁed to explain more than a small
part of it.
2judges thought that they are above average as far as their reversal rate on ap-
peal is concerned (Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, 2001).2 Experimental studies
(see Soll and Klayman, 2004) have shown that subjective conﬁdence intervals are
systematically too narrow given the accuracy of one’s information.3
A model with irrational behavior gives some degrees of freedom. In order
to bound it, we allow our price setters to pay a ﬁx e dc o s ti no r d e rt ob e c o m e
completely aware of “reality”.4 B u tw h oa r eg o i n gt ob es t u c kw i t ht h e i ro w n
perception of the world if not the ones that are overconﬁdent and believe that the
“gap between reality and perception” is small? In consequence in our model a large
fraction of price setters is composed by inattentive and irrational decisionmakers.
Woodford’s theory then predicts that a nominal disturbance can have large and
persistent real eﬀects.5 At the same time, the fact that the “gap between reality
and perception” is smaller in the “subjective mind” of the decisionmakers than
in “reality” helps to explain the high volatility of prices in an unrelated way to
fundamental disturbances. Indeed, overconﬁdent decisionmakers place a lot of
weight on their subjective perceptions which include the under-estimated non-
fundamental noise.
We calibrate our model to be consistent with the mean and the variance of price
changes in the KK data. Moreover, we tight our parametrization to be compatible
with the persistence of the eﬀects of nominal disturbances on output as found in
the VAR literature.
With rational price setters, our model implies that the average absolute size of
price changes is of the order of only 2%. But with overconﬁdence it increases up to
the value found in the data. In particular, for a reasonable degree of overconﬁdence
documented in experimental studies we ﬁnd that the average absolute size of price
2See for example Compte and Postlewaite (2004) for further references.
3In ﬁnance researchers have analyzed the implications of overconﬁdence on the ﬁnancial mar-
kets, see Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001), Daniel, Hirshleifer, Teoh (2002) and
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) among others.
4A recent related work is that of Reis (2005) in which he shows that information costs can
rationalize a model where fully rational price setters have diﬀerent information sets as in Mankiw
and Reis (2002). However in his model information ﬂows with delays while in our model, as in
the Sims’s theory, information ﬂows in each period with a noisy channel.
5In a recent work Morris and Shin (2006) have emphasized that in models with forward-
looking expectations even the existence of a small fraction of uninformed agents about the future
path of fundamentals can generate persistence in the price behavior.
3changes is of the order of 4−5%. This is quite a success for a model that does not
rely at all on idiosyncratic fundamental shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the static model under
full information. Section 2 discusses the incomplete-information model. Section
3 approximates and solves the incomplete-information model. Section 4 discusses
the price implications of the static model and the role of overconﬁdence. Section
5 extends the model to an inﬁnite horizon. Section 6 performs the calibration
of the model and studies the success of the model in explaining the empirical
evidence. Section 7 presents some statistical tests to study whether overconﬁdence
is statistically detectable. Section 8 concludes.
1M o d e l
In this section, we present a partial-equilibrium model of price-setting behavior
in which ﬁrms have full information on the structure, parameters and variables
of interest.6 We consider a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by i on the unit inter-
val [0,1].E a c h ﬁrm produces a good that is diﬀerentiated in the preferences of
consumers. We do not explicitly model neither consumer preferences nor their
optimization problem. We just assume what is needed to characterize the price-
setting problem of ﬁrms. Firms are proﬁt maximizers and set their prices in a
monopolistic-competitive market. The problem of a generic ﬁrm j is to choose the














that depends on the relative price of the good j with respect to the general price









6The model is similar to the one used in Ball and Romer (1989, 1991) and Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987).
4and on aggregate production Y .7 The parameter ε (with ε > 1) denotes the
elasticity of substitution across diﬀerentiated goods in consumer preferences. Firms
use labor L(j) to produce goods through the production function Y (j)=AL(j),
where A i sap r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c kc o m m o nt oa l lﬁrms; W is the nominal wage paid
for one unit of labor in the labor market.
In this market (not modelled here) we assume that the labor-supply schedule





with η > 0.8 We assume the existence of a monetary authority that has a perfect
control on the level of nominal spending in the economy. It follows that
M = PY (1.5)
where M, which may be labelled as money supply, is indeed controlled by the
monetary authority.




















Proﬁts of ﬁrm j are a function of the action (in game-theoretic sense) of ﬁrm j,
P(j),o ft h ea c t i o n so fa l lo t h e rﬁrms synthesized by the index P and the vector
θ ≡ (A,M). Firm j is of measure zero with respect to the aggregate, so its pricing
decision does not aﬀect the general price index P. W ed e n o t ew i t hP†(j) the












7In (1.3), we use the index i to emphasize that ﬁrm j is small with respect to the overall
market.
8This labor-supply schedule can be derived from the optimizing-behavior of households in a
general-equilibrium model. In particular, η would be a combination of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient
in consumer preferences and of the Frisch elasticity of substitution of labor supply, or in case of
local labor market of ε as well. Assuming a more general labor-supply schedule does not change
the following analysis.
5which is just the familiar markup rule over marginal cost. Since the right-hand
side of (1.7) is independent of j,a l lﬁrms set the same price. It follows that
















This rewriting shows that the parameter η determines whether price-setting de-
cisions are strategic complement (the case 0 < η < 1) or strategic substitutes
(η > 1). In the strategic-complement case, there is a positive elasticity between
the individual optimal price and the aggregate price level. The elasticity is negative
when pricing decisions are strategic substitutes.
2 Incomplete information
In this section, we formalize the incomplete-information version of the above model.
First, we assume that ﬁrms do not know the realization of the vector θ. In particular
we assume that θ belongs to a set of possible outcomes Θ and that each ﬁrm knows
that there is a probability distribution f(θ) over the possible outcomes.9 Each ﬁrm
can observe a signal sj that belongs to a set S. We model incomplete information
by assuming that each ﬁrm can only observe its own signal, which is then private
information.
Each ﬁrm believes that the signals are related to the possible outcomes θ
through a likelihood function ˜ lj(sj|θ) which might be speciﬁct ot h eﬁrm j but
common knowledge to all ﬁrms. We call ˜ lj(sj|θ) the subjective likelihood function
to distinguish it from the objective likelihood lj(sj|θ) that characterizes the true
conditional probability distribution of signals. In this way we depart from full
rationality.10
9We are assuming that Θ is ﬁnite for the sake of the discussion.
10In the literature on ambiguity in the priors, see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), it is assumed
instead that there can be multiple likelihoods, whereas we assume a single likelihood, which may
not be the correct one though.
6Given its private signal sj,e a c hﬁrm can update its probability distribution








for each θ ∈ Θ. However the realization of θ is not the only element of uncertainty
in the proﬁt function (1.6). Indeed proﬁts depend also on the non-observable gen-
eral price index P , which consists of the non-observable prices chosen by other
ﬁrms and through them on the private signals of the other ﬁrms. Since the like-
lihoods and priors are all common knowledge, each ﬁrm can apply rules of condi-
tional probability to obtain the conditional probability distribution of other ﬁrms’
signals given the realization of its own signal. But this is not enough to characterize
all the relevant uncertainty since pricing decisions of other ﬁr m sd e p e n do nt h e i r
beliefs about the signals of others as well as on the beliefs about others’ beliefs and
so on ad inﬁnitum. As in a Bayesian game of incomplete information, each ﬁrm
is not only characterized by its private signal, but also by all the full hierarchy of
beliefs about others.
To deﬁne the objective function of ﬁrms in this incomplete-information game,
we need to specify a broader set of states of nature Ω whose element ω represents
the knowledge and the interactive beliefs of each ﬁrm.11 Each ﬁrm is then charac-
terized by a type tj belonging to a set Tj and tj is related to ω through a function
τ(·) such that tj = τj(ω).
Given this abstract formalization of the states of nature, each ﬁrm strategy can
be understood as a mapping of the form P(j)=P(tj) from the space of types to
the space of possible prices. Each ﬁrm can form a probability distribution p(ω|tj)
over the broader set of states of nature Ω conditional on being of type tj.W ec a n





















11We follow Battigalli (2003) in this construction.
7In a Bayesian equilibrium a ﬁrm of type tj chooses its action P(j) to maximize the
objective function (2.9) given the strategy of other ﬁrms. We denote this choice





where Z is deﬁned as Z ≡ MPε−2 and P†(j) is given by (1.8). In particular, P†(j)
denotes the complete-information price. Indeed this is the price that a generic
ﬁrm would set if it knew the realization of ω. But this price does not necessarily
coincide with the full-information price since it is not yet speciﬁed whether other
ﬁrms know ω. According to (2.10), when there is incomplete information, a generic
ﬁrm j sets its price as a subjective expectation (appropriately weighted) of the price
that would be set under complete information.
We enrich the above framework by allowing each ﬁrm to acquire complete
information on the state of the economy —i.e. to know the state ω. This process
of acquisition of information is costly: real proﬁts are reduced by a ﬁxed cost ˜ cj.
Moreover, this decision is conditional on the ﬁrm of being of type tj.I n w h a t
follows we label as ‘informed’ ﬁrms the ones that acquire information, while the
others are denoted as ‘uninformed’.
We have to specify the strategy of each ﬁrm in this modiﬁed problem. We can
compactly write the strategy as a mapping σ(·) that maps from the space Tj of
types to the actions. It now involves two actions: the decision of whether or not to
acquire information and the price chosen following this decision. Note that when
informed a ﬁrm would set its price to P†(j). The expected proﬁtf u n c t i o no faﬁrm









Ag e n e r i cﬁrm j of type tj chooses to acquire complete information when the
expected increase in proﬁts in doing this is higher than the cost ˜ cj
E
j{π(P
†(j),P,θ) − π( ˜ P(j),P,θ)} ≥ ˜ c
j. (2.11)
Indeed since the proﬁt function is concave in the price P(j) then setting P(j) with
a ﬁner knowledge of the state of nature does not worsen utility, so that the LHS
of the above expression is always non-negative. Having observed the realization of
8its own signal, a ﬁrm j evaluates the LHS of (2.11) and acquires information and
sets the price P†(j), if (2.11) holds, otherwise it chooses ˜ P(j).
3 Approximation to the incomplete-information
model
In this section we solve the previous model in a log-linear approximation around
a steady-state in which θ = ¯ θ. As shown in the Appendix, a second-order approx-





where varj{·} denotes the variance operator conditional on the subjective infor-
mation set, while p†(j) is the log of the price that ﬁrm j would set with complete
information and cj is a reparametrization of the cost ˜ cj. The decision of acquiring
or not information depends on whether the subjective variance of the price that a
ﬁrm sets under complete information is higher than the cost cj.
An important implication of the approximation taken is that (3.12) can be
evaluated using just a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions. In
this log-linear approximation, equation (2.10) implies that the log of the price





where lower-case letters denote log of the respective variables.12 Moreover p†(j) is
independent of j and in a log-linear approximation to (1.8) is given by
p
† =( 1− η)p + ηp
∗, (3.14)





as a result of a ﬁrst-order approximation of (1.3).
12In the steady-state all ﬁrms set the same constant price.
9Let us denote with µ the fraction of ﬁrms that in equilibrium decide to keep
the subjective information set and assuming without loss of generality that agents
j ∈ [0,µ] are the ones who remain uninformed, we can write the above equation as
p = µ˜ p +( 1− µ)p
†, (3.15)








W ec a nt h e np l u g( 3 . 1 5 )i n t o( 3 . 1 4 )t oo b t a i n
p
† = δp




η +( 1− η)µ
,
with δ a decreasing function of µ and η ≤ δ ≤ 1 in case of strategic complements
(η < 1)a n dδ an increasing function of µ with 1 ≤ δ ≤ η in case of strategic
substitutes (η > 1).
The set of equations (3.13), one for each ﬁrm that remains uninformed, together
with (3.16) and (3.17) determine the equilibrium prices of informed and uninformed
ﬁrms in a ﬁrst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions.
To solve for the equilibrium prices, we describe in details the information struc-
t u r e . F i r s t ,w en o t et h a tu n c e r t a i n t ya b o u tt h ev e c t o rθ has collapsed to uncer-





where ¯ p∗ is a constant and u is a Gaussian white-noise process with variance σ2
u.I t
follows that the prior distribution of p∗ is Gaussian with mean ¯ p∗ and variance σ2
u.
These priors are common knowledge and correspond to the objective probability






13In the non-linear model, these priors correspond to the assumption on the distribution f(θ).
10where ξ
j is an idiosyncratic Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance ¯ σ2
ξ for
each j.M o r e o v e rξ
j is statistically independent of u as well as of ξ
i for each i 6= j.
All this information is common knowledge. Instead, the realization of the signal
sj is private information.
In the previous section, we assumed that the subjective likelihood function
˜ l(s
j
t|θt) can be diﬀerent from the true likelihood through which signals are ex-
tracted. We capture this by assuming that the belief, ¯ σ2
ξ, on the variance of the
noise ξ
j does not correspond to the true variance σ2
ξ.
Given this information structure, each ﬁrm can form its own expectation of the
full-information price p∗ as in a standard signal-extraction problem
E
jp





where the weight ¯ rj is deﬁned as
¯ r










Since ¯ λ is common and common knowledge across the diﬀerent ﬁrms, then ¯ rj is
independent of j and equal to a common ¯ r. In particular ¯ λ represents the noise-to-
fundamental variance ratio and can be interpreted as an index of conﬁdence in how
a ﬁrm’s private signal is a good representation of the full-information price. Lower
values of ¯ λ implies a higher weight to the signal when ﬁrms form expectations of
the full-information price and then a high degree of conﬁdence on the subjective
information set. Since σ2
ξ does not necessarily correspond to the prior ¯ σ2
ξ,w ed e ﬁne







with a respective value for the weight r =1 /(1 + λ).W h e n¯ λ < λ ( ¯ r>r ) ﬁrms
are over-conﬁdent and trust more their subjective perception of the world than in
the case they would have known the true likelihood. In the opposite case, there is
under-conﬁdence.





∗ =( 1− ¯ r)¯ p
∗ +¯ rs
j
w h i c hi st h e naﬁrst-order expectation belief.14 Furthermore, each ﬁrm can form





j[(1 − ¯ r)¯ p
∗ +¯ rs




and so on. We can construct all the hierarchy of expectation beliefs, ﬁrst and
higher-order expectations as well as all the other relevant moments that identify a
generic type tj in the ﬁrst-order approximation to the model.
To solve for the equilibrium prices of informed and uninformed agents and for
the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms that acquire or not information, we ﬁrst guess
that µ is known to each type tj. We then verify that this is indeed the case. Given




t +( 1− δ)E
j˜ p (3.19)
which can be averaged across all uninformed price setters to obtain
˜ p = δ ¯ Ep
∗ +( 1− δ) ¯ E˜ p,
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned the operator ¯ E(·) ≡ 1
µ
R µ
0 ¯ E(·)di which represents the aver-
age expectation among the uninformed ﬁrms. We can iterate the above expression
to obtain







where the (k +1 ) −order average expectation operator is deﬁned as ¯ E(k+1)(·) ≡
¯ E( ¯ E(k)(·)) for each k ≥ 1.15 It follows that the average price of uninformed
ﬁrms is a linear combination of their higher-order average expectations of the
full-information price. We can plug (3.20) into (3.19) to obtain
˜ p(j)=δE
jp








14See Allen et al. (2005) and Amato and Shin (2003, 2006) for examples of solutions of problems
with iterated expectations.
15Under the restriction that η(2µ − 1) < 2µ , δ is such that |1 − δ| < 1.
12The price set by an uninformed ﬁrm depends on its own expectation of the full-
information price and its own expectation of the average expectation (of unin-
formed ﬁrms) of the full-information prices as well as on all higher-order expecta-
tions. Since (3.18) holds for all uninformed ﬁr m s ,w ec a no b t a i nt h a t
¯ Ep
∗ =( 1− ¯ r)¯ p
∗ +¯ rp
∗, (3.21)







idi =0 . (3.22)
It follows that the ﬁrm i’s expectation of the average expectation of the full-
information price is given by
E
i ¯ Ep




=( 1 − ¯ r)¯ p
∗ +¯ r(1 − ¯ r)¯ p +¯ r
2s
i
from which it follows that the second-order average estimate is given
¯ E
(2)p




By re-iterating the above arguments, we get that the k-fold average expectation of
the full-information price is
¯ E
kp





We can substitute (3.23) into (3.20) to obtain
˜ p =
1 − ¯ r








η(1 − ¯ r)+( 1− η)(1 − ¯ r)µ




η +( 1− η)(1 − ¯ r)µ
p
∗. (3.24)




(1 − ¯ r)(1 − η)µ




η +( 1− η)(1 − ¯ r)µ
p
∗. (3.25)
16See Uhlig (1996) for the conditions under which this holds.











t} is the variance of the full-information price level conditional on the





u(1 − ¯ r
j).
We can then write the above inequality as
∙
η




u(1 − ¯ r
j) ≥ c
j, (3.26)
where we have kept the distinction —since it matters for the discussion that follows-
between the own degree of conﬁdence ¯ rj and the others’ degree of conﬁdence ¯ r—
although we have assumed that they are the same.17
According to (3.26), several parameters of the model drive the incentives for
ﬁrm j to acquire information. The higher is the prior on the variance of the
full-information price, σ2
u, the higher are the incentives to acquire information.
Obviously, the lower the cost cj, the higher those incentives. In the case of strategic
complementarity in the pricing decision, 0 < η < 1, the higher is the fraction of
ﬁrms that are acquiring information (i.e. the lower the µ)t h eh i g h e ra r et h e
incentives for the individual ﬁrm to acquire information. This result is of the same
nature as the one found by Ball and Romer (1989) in a similar model but with
only imperfect information, in which ﬁrms’s decisions are on whether to change or
not prices.
Each ﬁrm’s decision is also inﬂuenced by the degree of conﬁdence in the infor-
mativeness of the signal. If ¯ rj is high (¯ λ
j is low), i.e. it believes that the signal
conveys good information on the full-information price, it will not have incentives
to acquire ﬁner information. A high degree of conﬁdence implies that ﬁrms are
going to be stuck with their perceptions of the world when setting their prices.
Interestingly, if the conﬁdence of others increases (¯ λ decreases and ¯ r increases)
then the price under complete information has higher subjective variance since the





/µ and by assuming a law of large numbers to hold for
R µ
0 ξ
i¯ ridi =0 .
14average price of uninformed ﬁrms is getting close to the full information price, as
shown in (3.21). Then, each individual ﬁrm has higher incentives to acquire infor-
mation and imitate other ﬁrms —when pricing decisions are strategic complements.
We move to characterize the equilibrium value of µ, under the assumption




η(1 − ¯ r)
1
2





and note that (3.26) implies that all ﬁrms with cj less than c∗ acquire information.
Assuming that the distribution of cj is common knowledge with a density function
f(cj) on a support [c
¯
,¯ c], then the measure µ of agents that remain uninformed is
given by Z ¯ c
c∗
f(c)dc = µ. (3.27)
This solution conﬁrms our initial guess that µ is a function of known parameters
a n dt h e nk n o w nt oe a c ht y p etj. The properties of the distribution function f(·)
determines the existence and the characteristics of the equilibrium. Indeed when
cj = c for each j, multiple equilibria are possible for the same reasons as they
occur in the imperfect-information model of Ball and Romer (1989). For other
distributions f(·) multiple equilibria might disappear. Since this is not the focus
of this work, we assume that f(·) is such that there exists a unique equilibrium.

















[η +( 1− η)(1 − ¯ r)µ]
3 [−η +( 1− ¯ r)(1− η)µ]
is negative for all η such that η > ¯ η where ¯ η is a function of ¯ r bounded above by
1/2 a n dd e c r e a s i n gt oz e r ow h e n¯ r increases to one. It follows that for values of η
18The solution µ that we refer as stable is the one in which the LHS of (3.27), considered as a
function of µ, intersects the 45 degrees line with a positive slope less than unitary.
15in this range an increase in the degree of conﬁdence (¯ λ decreases and ¯ r increases)
raises the fraction of ﬁrms that remain uninformed.
In particular, overconﬁdence increases the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms that
choose not to acquire information in comparison to the equilibrium fraction of
rational signal-extraction problem.
4 Price implications of incomplete information
and overconﬁdence
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,w eh a v es h o w nh o wt od e t e r m i n et h ef r a c t i o no fﬁrms that
in equilibrium decide to remain uninformed. A high degree of conﬁdence under
standard regularity conditions implies a higher fraction of uninformed ﬁrms. In
this section we study the price implications of the model and in particular the
relation between excess volatility of prices and overconﬁdence.
A ﬁrst important implication is that the model displays two levels of hetero-
geneity: at a ﬁrst stage there are diﬀerences in prices between informed and unin-
formed ﬁrms, second, within uninformed ﬁrms, prices are related to the realization
of subjective signals. We can rewrite equation (3.25) and show that the price of
the informed ﬁrms is
p
† =¯ p




η +( 1− η)(1 − ¯ r)µ
.
The prices of the informed ﬁrms react only to the fundamental shocks of the model.
On the opposite the uninformed ﬁrms set their prices as a subjective expectation
of p† , based on their signals which include also non-fundamental noises. We obtain
that a generic uninformed ﬁrm j sets
˜ p(j)=¯ p
∗ + ˆ ku+ ˆ kξ
j, (4.30)
while the average price of uninformed ﬁr m si sg i v e nb y
˜ p =¯ p
∗ + ˆ ku.
16We ﬁrst discuss how prices react to fundamental shocks. Following (4.29) prices
of informed ﬁrms react less than proportionally to fundamental shocks when pric-
ing decisions are strategic complements, since (1 + ¯ λ)ˆ k<1, but more than pro-
portionally in the strategic-substitute case. As shown in (4.30), the response of
uninformed ﬁr m si sa l w a y ss m a l l e rt h a nt h a to fi n f o r m e dﬁrms, since ¯ λ > 0.
However, prices of uninformed ﬁrms react also to non-fundamental shocks, ξ
j,
in the same proportion as they do with fundamental shocks.
Overconﬁdence— modelled as the possibility that uninformed ﬁrms misinterpret
the model of the economy by using an incorrect likelihood — can aﬀect the volatility
of prices. Using equation (4.30), we obtain that the “true” variance of prices for a
generic uninformed agent j is




Equation (4.29) implies that the variance of the prices of informed ﬁr m si sg i v e n
by
var{p





It follows that the ratio of the volatilities of prices of uninformed and informed








(1 + ¯ λ)
#2
.
In a model in which there is no discrepancy between the “perception” and “reality”
so that the signal-extraction problem is rational (i.e. λ = ¯ λ), prices of uninformed
ﬁrms are always less volatile than informed ﬁrms. With overconﬁdent ﬁrms, it is
instead possible for the reverse to happen. It is suﬃcient that (1 + ¯ λ) < (1 + λ)
1
2.
In particular it is required to have that the true volatility of the idiosyncratic noise
σ2
ξ is high enough with respect to the perceived ¯ σ2
ξ.
A second important implication of overconﬁdence is that it is even possible to
have excess volatility of the price of an individual uninformed ﬁrm with respect to








(1 + ¯ λ)
#2
where ζ is a positive parameter given by ζ = ˆ k/¯ r such that ζ < 1 (ζ > 1)w h e n
pricing decisions are strategic complements (substitutes). To have excess volatility
17of the prices of uninformed ﬁrms with respect to fundamentals, it is required that
(1 + ¯ λ) < ζ(1 + λ)
1
2 which is then a more (less) stringent condition than before
when pricing decisions are strategic complements (substitutes).19
Overconﬁdence has two important roles in this model. On one side, it implies
that a higher fraction of ﬁrms is going to decide optimally not to acquire infor-
mation and just pay attention to their own perceptions. On the other side, the
prices of individual uninformed ﬁrms can be more volatile than fundamental dis-
turbances and this volatility can be mainly driven by the noise in the perception of
the full-information price. These two results prepare the stage for our explanation
of the high volatility of individual prices which is found in the data without neither
assuming high volatility of fundamental disturbances nor sacriﬁcing persistence in
the response of prices to fundamental shocks—among which monetary shocks. In-
deed, in the dynamic extension of the above model, the fact that overconﬁdent
price setters are less prone to acquire information implies that there can be a
high proportion of this kind of subjectively-driven price setters. Woodford (2002)
has shown that in this dynamic model higher-order expectations matter for deter-
mining persistent eﬀects of output and prices following exactly those disturbances
to which agents are subjectively informed. On the other side, the existence of
subjectively-informed ﬁr m sw h i c ha r eo v e r c o n ﬁdent and have irrational beliefs can
produce in this context an excess volatility of prices with respect to fundamentals.
5I n ﬁnite-horizon model
In this section, we consider an extension of the previous model to an inﬁnite
horizon. We assume that each ﬁrm does not know the realization of the sequence
{θt}∞
t=t0.H o w e v e r ,e a c hﬁrm has a prior distribution on the sequence {θt}∞
t=t0 that
c o i n c i d e sw i t ht h ec o r r e c td i s t r i b u t i o na n dw h i c hi sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e .I ne a c h
period and contingency, each ﬁrm can observe a private signal s
j
t. In particular
the sequence of signals {s
j
t}∞
t=t0,o n ef o re a c hj, is related to the sequence {θt}∞
t=t0
through a likelihood function which is known and common knowledge but, as
19Note that with no overconﬁdence (λ = ¯ λ) the ratio is always smaller that unity even in the
case of strategic substitutes (ζ > 1). This is clear if we note that ˆ k = δ/(δ + λ) and that the
ratio is less than unity when Q(δ)=λδ
2 − 2λδ − λ
2 < 0, which holds for the permissible δ, i.e.
such that |1 − δ| < 1.
18before, does not necessarily coincide with the correct likelihood function. As in
the previous model, incomplete information is modelled by assuming that each
ﬁrm knows only its own realization of the signals and not those of the others, as
well as not the price index and the individual prices. Each ﬁrm has the option to
acquire information on the states of nature — in the abstract sense as it applies to
the dynamic extension of the previous model. This can be done by paying a cost
˜ cj which is known. Once the cost is paid the ﬁrm remains in the ‘informed’ state
f o r e v e r ,o t h e r w i s ei tc o n t i n u e st oo b s e r v eo n l yi t sp r i v a t es i g n a la n de a c hp e r i o d
decides whether to acquire or not information.
We assume that ﬁrms choose prices to maximize the expected discounted value








where β is such that 0 < β < 1.20 E
j
t0 is the appropriate expectation operator
conditional on the information at time t0. Prices are set freely in each period. An








for each period t after having paid the information cost. An ‘uninformed’ ﬁrm











where Zt has the same deﬁnition as before and the expectation operator is condi-
tional on the type t
j
t that a ﬁrm j has at time t.
To characterize the decision for a generic ﬁrm j to acquire or not information,
we guess an equilibrium and then verify that prices and information decisions
are consistent with that equilibrium. The analysis is simpliﬁed by noting that the
fraction of ﬁr m st h a tr e m a i nu n i n f o r m e de a c hp e r i o dc a n n o ti n c r e a s eo v e rt i m e ,i . e .
{µt}
+∞
t=t0 is a non-increasing sequence. Of the many equilibria that can exist, we are
interested in ones in which µt = µ for each t ≥ t0. In particular, in these stationary
equilibria, whichever ﬁrm decides to be informed does it in the ﬁrst period. For
this to be optimal, the strategy of getting information in the ﬁrst period should
20We can generalize the analysis that follows by assuming a stochastic discount factor to
evaluate real proﬁts across contingencies and time.
19give higher expected discounted proﬁts than the strategy of waiting until a generic
time T, given the equilibrium strategies of all other ﬁrms. In particular at time t0
the expected proﬁts to acquire immediately information and pay the cost should
be higher than the strategy of remaining with the subjective information until a
generic period T a n dp a yt h ec o s ti nt h a tp e r i o d .F o rag e n e r i cﬁrm j to become
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We take a second-order approximation of the above problem around a station-


















t} is a constant that does
not depend on j and is also independent of t in a stationary ﬁltering problem. The






j(1 − β), (5.32)
which is also independent of T. It is then also easy to check that the condition
(5.32) with the reverse inequality is all that is needed to verify, in a second-order
approximation, that for a generic ﬁrm j it is always optimal to remain uninformed.
Then (5.32) for each ﬁrm j determines the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms that remain
uninformed in equilibrium. We verify now that vart{p
†
t} is constant and that µ is
also a constant and known within the information set of each type of ﬁrm at time
t0. As before, we just need to characterize the equilibrium values of prices in a
log-linear approximation to the equilibrium.
It is still true that the set of equations (3.13), one for each ﬁrm that remains
uninformed, together with (3.16) and (3.17) determine the equilibrium prices of
20informed and uninformed ﬁrms in a ﬁrst-order approximation to the equilibrium
conditions. We continue to assume that each ﬁrm receives a private signal s
j
t that











t is an idiosyncratic Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance σ2
ξ for
each j. We assume that ξ
j
t, for each j, is statistically independent of the sequence
{p∗
t} as well as of the sequence {ξ
i
t} for each i 6= j. All this information is common
knowledge, but the realization of the private signal s
j
t is private information. As
b e f o r e ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h ev a r i a n c eo ft h en o i s e s¯ σ2
ξ does not correspond to the
true variance σ2
ξ. We allow now {p∗
t} to be a ﬁrst-order autoregressive stochastic






t−1 + ut (5.34)
with |ρ| ≤ 1 where ut is Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance σ2
u. The
assumption of persistence of the unobservable shock can in principle be a source of
complication in the solution of the model, for an inﬁnite dimensional state might
be necessary to keep track of all the beliefs and higher-order beliefs of other ﬁrms.
Woodford (2002) has shown that the dimension of the hidden-state space is ﬁnite
in the same model as the one presented here but with all ﬁrms assumed to be
uninformed and no endogenous decision of acquiring information. Details of the
solution can be found in the appendix.
In this solution, the general price index evolves according to
pt =¯ p
∗ + ρ(1 − ˆ k)pt−1 + ρˆ kp
∗
t−1 +[ δ(1 − µ)(1− ˆ k)+ˆ k]ut,





∗ + ρ(1 − ˆ k)p
†
t−1 + ρˆ kp
∗
t−1 +[ δ(1 − ˆ k)+ˆ k]ut, (5.35)
while the price of uninformed ﬁrms follows
˜ pt(j)=¯ p
∗ + ρ(1 − ˆ k)˜ pt−1(j)+ρˆ kp
∗
t−1 + ˆ k(ut + ξ
j
t). (5.36)
21The ˆ k in the dynamic model is a diﬀerent function of other parameters than the ˆ k in the
static model. We use the same notation, since when ρ =0the two expressions coincide.




t so that subtracting (5.36) from (5.35) we can













t−1)+δ(1 − ˆ k)ut − ˆ kξ
j
t
from which it follows that the contemporaneous variance of p
†
t in a stationary






1+¯ λ[1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)]2





where the static model is nested under the assumption that ρ =0 .W e c a n n o w
evaluate (5.32). It follows that equilibrium fraction of uninformed ﬁrms is implicitly
deﬁned by the same condition as (3.27) where now instead c∗ is given by
c
∗ ≡
1+¯ λ[1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)]2





The main qualitative results of the static model hold in this extension with some
qualiﬁcations. Indeed it is still the case that overconﬁdence is needed for the
volatility of prices of uninformed to be higher than that of informed. Indeed
we show in the appendix that the ratio of the unconditional variances between






if and only if
λ > 2¯ λ + ¯ λ
2[1 − ρ
2(1 − ˆ k)
2],
which nests the previous result. In this dynamic model, it does not only matter
the diﬀerence between the ‘true’ and the subjective degree of conﬁdence, but also
other parameters. Indeed since ˆ k<1, the discrepancy between λ and ¯ λ that is
needed in order to have excessive volatility of the uninformed prices is smaller
than in the static case. The reason is that the persistence of the shock process
makes past estimates useful to forecast the future evolution of the state. But this
leads to a larger reliance on their subjective perception (signals) and therefore,
comparatively to the static case, agents are driven more by their perceptions. As
a consequence, the amount of overconﬁdence needed to have excess volatility is
less. This is also the case if the mass of uninformed agents (µ) increases since ˆ k
becomes smaller and if the degree of strategic complementarity increases, i.e. η
becomes smaller.
226 How much overconﬁdence is needed to match
the absolute size of individual price changes?
In this section, we aim at evaluating the empirical performance of the above model.
The objective is to be able to explain in a reasonable way the large absolute
price changes that KK found in the data. With reasonable we mean that our
model should be also consistent with some other moments of the data reported
in their study and at the same time require information costs which are in line
with other empirical studies. Moreover, we want to show that our explanation can
be consistent with a model that allows for a persistent response of output to a
nominal spending disturbance.22
Considered all together, these objectives are quite ambitious for a model that
has only one fundamental shock and does not make any use of fundamental idio-
syncratic disturbances. The only source of heterogeneity are the private signals of
the ﬁrms. In our model the only possibilities for increasing the size of the absolute
price changes are to increase either the degree of overconﬁdence in the signals or
the variance of the fundamental disturbance. By including other types of idio-
s y n c r a t i cs h o c k sw ec a ni np r i n c i p l er e l a xt h ea m o u n to fo v e r c o n ﬁdence needed
to explain the data and then be more successful, but at the cost of obscuring the
message of the previous model.
Moreover, there can be several other possible mechanisms through which prices
change that we have not analyzed in the previous model — again for the sake of
simplicity and tractability. Most important is the fact that indeed Bils and Klenow
(2004) found that prices are sticky with a median duration of 4.3 months. But in
our model ﬁrms change their price in each period, even if they have incomplete
i n f o r m a t i o n .B e c a u s eo ft h i sn e g l i g e n c e ,w ed e c i d et om e a s u r et h et i m ep e r i o do f
our model in quarters, during which we might reasonably assume that all the ﬁrms
had the time to adjust their prices. It is reasonable to think that the large absolute
price changes that KK document on a monthly basis can be smaller at quarterly
frequencies. This again would be an argument in our favor, since it is going to
require a lower degree of overconﬁdence.
The parameters of the model are (ρ, ¯ p∗,σ2
u, ¯ λ, λ
¯ λ,η,ε,F),w h e r eF indicates the
22For calibration purposes we are going to treat the shock in the full infomation price as a
nominal spending shock.
23parameters that characterize the distribution of the costs. We calibrate ρ =1in a
way that our model can be consistent with a unit root in the general price index,
which is in general not rejected by the data.23 Under this assumption equilibrium
output in deviation from the steady state (i.e. yt ≡ lnYt/¯ Y ) follows the process
yt =( 1− ˆ k)yt−1 +( 1− c)ut,
where c =( δµ+1−δ)ˆ k+δ(1−µ) and δ = η/(η+(1−η)µ). From this process we
can deduce that the half-life of the response of output to a nominal spending shock
is given by τ = −ln2/ln(1 − ˆ k). Since we want our model to display a persistent
response of output and at the same time be consistent with all the other facts,
we assume that τ is equal to 4 quarters as it is suggested by the VAR literature
and which is a reasonable value according to the discussion of Woodford (2003, ch.
3). This assumption implies that ˆ k =0 .159. Under the assumption of ρ =1 , the
process of the inﬂa t i o nr a t ei sg i v e nb y 24
πt = ˆ k¯ p
∗ +( 1− ˆ k)πt−1 + cut − (c − ˆ k)ut−1. (6.40)
In their sample, KK ﬁnd an average monthly percentage price change( e x c l u d i n g
sales) among ﬁr m st h a tc h a n g ep r i c e so f1.11 % with a standard deviation of 1.14%.
This corresponds to a calibration of ¯ p∗ =1 .11 for the mean price change among
all ﬁrms in our model. Furthermore, their data on the variance of the inﬂation
provide an additional moment condition to match for the variance of the model
inﬂation rate, σ2
π, which according to (6.40) is just a function of the form
σ
2
π = f(µ,ˆ k,η,σ
2
u) (6.41)
pinning down a relation between η, σ2
u and µ for given ˆ k, σ2
π.
Recent studies on the costs of price adjustment like Zbaracki et al. (2003) have
shown that managerial and customer costs of price adjustment constitute a large
fraction of ﬁrms proﬁts. In fact, managerial costs (which refer to information gath-
ering, decision-making and communicating-to-sales-team costs) are 4.61% of the
23We have experimented with data on the non-shelter CPI for the sample period of KK
(1988:1-2003:4) and found that a null of a unit root in the price level cannot be rejected.
24Note that since the idiosyncratic noise washes out in the aggregate, the amount of overcon-
ﬁdence doesn’t aﬀect the aggregate dynamics of inﬂation and the relevant mean and standard
deviation.
24proﬁts. We use this evidence to measure the costs of acquiring information in our
model. We parameterize parsimoniously the distribution of costs per period as a
fraction of steady state proﬁts by assuming a uniform distribution with a minimum
cost of zero and a mean cost of 4.61%.25 Furthermore, we assume an elasticity of
substitution between the diﬀerentiated products ε =6 , which corresponds to a
markup under full information of 20%. Given these assumptions, and noting that




which is then another implicit relation between η, σ2
u and µ for given ˆ k.
The parameter η is critical for determining whether pricing decisions are strate-
gic complements or substitutes and plays a crucial role in determining the persis-
tence of the response of output to a monetary shock, as discussed in Woodford
(2003, ch. 3). Indeed, Woodford (2003, ch. 3) has shown that when a suﬃcient
degree of strategic complementarity is assumed, i.e. a low value of η around 0.15,
then a sticky-price model can account for a prolonged response of output. On
the opposite case, Chari et al. (2000) assume a value of η equal to 2.25, leading
to pricing decisions that are strategic complements and then have argued that a
sticky-price model is not able to generate enough persistence. In this work, we take
an agnostic view on η and experiment how our results may diﬀer for a range of
values for this parameter. In particular, we report results for a range of η that goes
from the low number assumed in Woodford (2003, ch. 3) to the high number used
in Chari et al. (2000). Having ﬁxed η, then equations (6.41) and (6.42) determine
µ and σ2
u.W ec a nd e t e r m i n eδ a n d ,b e a r i n gi nm i n dt h a t¯ λ = δ(1− ˆ k)/ˆ k2,w ec a n
also determine the degree of conﬁdence compatible with our calibration strategy.
Table 1 presents the results of the calibration and in particular how the para-
meters and the equilibrium fraction µ are inﬂuenced by the chosen value of η.W e
observe that lower values of η require higher variance of the fundamental shock σ2
u
t om a t c ht h ev a r i a n c eo fp r i c ec h a n g e si nt h ed a t aa n da tt h es a m et i m eh a v et h e
model consistent with a half-life of 4 quarters and reasonable information costs.
However, the degree of conﬁdence on the signals, which is ¯ λ, that measures how
good the signals are as a proxy of the fundamental shock, is low for low values of η.
This perhaps indicates that the model is more reasonable when η is in this range
25See details in the appendix.
25and a suﬃcient degree of price complementarity is assumed. Using η =0 .15 we
obtain that 83% of ﬁrms maintain a subjective information set when setting their
prices. This value decreases as η increases and reaches 57% when η =2 .25.
Table 1: Calibration and Equilibrium Fraction µ
η =0.15 η =0.5 η =0.9 η =1.1 η =1.5 η =1.9 η =2.25
¯ p∗ 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11
σu 4.234 2.97 2.310 2.131 1.903 1.764 1.678
¯ λ 5.81 20.6 31.20 35.05 41.07 45.53 48.62
µ 0.831 0.611 0.580 0.577 0.573 0.571 0.570
We then proceed to simulate the model in order to characterize the pricing
behavior of 20000 ﬁrms over the sample 1988:1-2003:4 as in KK. Over this sample,
we compute the same statistics that they report and in particular we focus on the
average over the sample and across ﬁrms of the absolute of the changes in the
individual prices for two subsequent observations. This statistic corresponds to
the statistic |dp| for regular prices of all items in their Table 1. By construction,
our simulations are in line with the statistics that they report on the mean and
variance of the price changes.26
Our results on the variable |dp| depend on the degree of overconﬁdence assumed.
We have deﬁned overconﬁdence as the ratio λ/¯ λ which is equivalent to σ2
ξ/¯ σ2
ξ,t h e
ratio of the true variance of the noise with respect to the perceived variance. We
choose as an index of overconﬁdence the parameter γ = σξ/¯ σξ w h i c ht h e ng i v e sa
m e a s u r eo nh o wm u c ht h et r u es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no ft h en o i s ee x c e e d st h eb e l i e v e d
one. We repeat our simulations for the chosen values of η by letting γ varies from
1 to 8. In particular γ =1corresponds to the rational signal extraction problem.
The results are presented in Table 2.
26We have repeated the described simulation 1000 times to smooth out any inﬂuence of the
small sample on the results and we average the statistics across these repeated simulations.
26Table 2: Average absolute value of price changes (%) and overconﬁdence
η =0.15 η =0.5 η =0.9 η =1.1 η =1.5 η =1.9 η =2.25
γ =1 1.83 2.012 1.99 1.97 1.95 1.94 1.93
γ =2 2.75 3.02 2.89 2.86 2.8 2.76 2.73
γ =3 3.80 4.05 3.86 3.79 3.69 3.63 3.59
γ =4 4.88 5.13 4.83 4.73 4.6 4.51 4.46
γ =5 5.98 6.21 5.81 5.68 5.52 5.40 5.33
γ =6 7.07 7.28 6.79 6.65 6.43 6.30 6.21
γ =7 8.18 8.37 7.77 7.60 7.36 7.19 7.08
γ =8 9.30 9.45 8.76 8.56 8.28 8.08 7.96
Table 2 shows for each pair γ and η the average absolute value of price changes
(|dp|) implied by this model. The reference value is the 8.5% of KK. In a rational
signal extraction problem (γ =1 )we obtain a value close to 2%.B u t t o m a t c h
their reported value we need a degree of overconﬁdence close to 7 or 8,w h i c h
can be considered as a large number. Indeed, experimental studies, like Soll and
Klayman (2004), have shown that on a series of questions where individuals are
a s k e dt of o r ma n8 0 %c o n ﬁdence interval the actual hit rate is around 40%, which
can be translated in γ being approximately equal to 2.5.27 In more complicated
tasks, as forecasting the level of the exchange rate with a conﬁdence interval of
90% (see Oberlechner and Osler, 2004), the hit rate ranges from 5% to 70% with
an average of 40%, rationalizing values of γ higher than 3. In general values from
2 to 4 can be considered as reasonable.
If we set our target less ambitiously and ask what is the implied |dp| for a degree
of overconﬁdence close to experimental evidence, we ﬁnd that this can range from
3% to 5%, doubling the value under a fully rational model and being close to
explain more than the 50 − 60% of the value found in the data.28 We think that
these results can be suggestive of the fact that the mechanism we underline can
27This value can be obtained by rough computation on conﬁdence intervals for normal distri-
butions.
28As Table 1 shows, this result does not depend on the value of η assumed.
27be important to explain the excess volatility of prices —although we acknowledge
that there can be other important mechanisms from which we have abstracted in
this analysis.
7 Detecting overconﬁdence
One important objection against the above structure is that it is unrealistic to
think that ﬁrms can only observe their own signals. In reality, ﬁrms can gather
detailed information on the various components of their proﬁts through which
t h e ym i g h tb ea b l et oi n f e rt h es t r u c t u r eo ft h ee c o n o m ya n du n c o v e rt h ep r o c e s s
of the fundamentals. This objection misunderstands the essence of a model of
inattention as described in Sims (2003), since in his theory it does not really
matter the amount of information available but how this information is processed
by the decisionmakers. In reality, price setters are not even aware about the
structure of the model and in any case are in general unsure about the properties
and the characteristics of the processes that drive the economy. We interpret the
assumption that ﬁrms can only observe their own signals as a simple representation
of a more complicated world in which there are several dimensions of uncertainty.
The gap between the subjective signal and the fundamental shock is a measure of
the limitations that ﬁrms face in understanding completely the model economy.
Overconﬁdence means that decisionmakers in general over-estimate their ability to
understand the correct model.
In our model, decisionmakers are stubborn in their beliefs. Indeed, they do
not question at all the structure of the model and treat the parameters as ﬁxed
and known. However, they are given a possibility to learn, but a fraction of them
optimally decide to remain subjectively informed, given their beliefs. In practice,
one reason for why people are overconﬁdent is that there is conﬁrmatory bias (see
Soll and Klayman, 2004) — the tendency to interpret the evidence in a way to
corroborate their own beliefs. If in our model ﬁrms were putting some uncertainty
on some parameters of the model or having multiple priors on them, their decision
process would have changed substantially from the one detailed in the previous
sections and there will be learning from the signal observation. These analyses,
although interesting, go beyond the scope of this work and will be subject of further
research.
28In this section that goes beyond the framework presented in the previous sec-
tions, we are interested to know how quickly an agent outside the model, that treats
the parameters of the stochastic process of the signals as ﬁxed but unknown, would
detect that ﬁrms are overconﬁdent. So think of having one classical statistician
per ﬁrm that collects period after period the realized signals and that tries to test
the beliefs of the ﬁrm. In particular, we assume that each statistician is sure that



















































where the current forecast of ξ
j
t,d e ﬁned as ξ
j











t − ¯ p + ξ
j
t−1|t−1),
for a given initial condition ξ
j
0|0.
It is then possible to write the following likelihood ratio to test separately each
parameter






















































where ¯ λ, σ2
u0,a n d¯ p∗
0 correspond to the values under the respective null. Each of
the above test statistics is distributed asymptotically as a χ2 distribution with 1
29degree of freedom. In particular LR1 tests whether the belief on λ, which is equal
to ¯ λ, is statistically signiﬁcant; LR2 and LR3 test σ2
u0 and ¯ p∗
0, respectively. In the
above model, we assumed that the only element of irrationality is the degree of
conﬁdence, so ¯ λ does not correspond to the true λ while σ2
u0 and ¯ p∗
0 coincides with
t h et r u ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .
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Figure 1: Rejection rate (%) for the null λ =5 .81 with signiﬁcance level of 1%
(solid line) and 5% (dashed line).
Figure 1 (for LR1), 2 (for LR2)a n d3( f o rLR3)r e p o r tt h es h a r eo fs t a t i s t i c i a n s
that are rejecting the null hypothesis of each test respectively for T that goes from
1 to 61 quarters, as in the KK sample. We run the test for the parameter values
that correspond to the calibration when η =0 .15 (ﬁrst column of Table 1) and for
a reasonable degree of overconﬁdence. In particular ¯ p∗
0 =1 .11%, σu0 =4 .234%.
and ¯ λ =5 .81,w h i l et h et r u eλ is 16 times ¯ λ. In practice, with the ﬁr s tt e s tw ea r e














Figure 2: Rejection rate (%) for the null σu0 =4 .234 with signiﬁcance level of 1%
(solid line) and 5% (dashed line).
t e s t i n gw h e na ni n d e xo fo v e r c o n ﬁdence equal to 4 (the γ of the previous section)
becomes statistically detectable. In each ﬁgure, we present results for 1% and 5%
signiﬁcance levels.29
As expected, the share of statisticians that rejects the null hypothesis in the
σ2
u-test and ¯ p∗-test is fairly low, since the null corresponds to the truth in these
cases. This is shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively, where the share of rejections
is always below 10% for the σ2
u−test and below 7% for the ¯ p∗−test.
Interestingly enough, it takes a considerable amount of time for the statisticians
to detect that the ﬁrms are overconﬁdent. We observe in Figure 1 that for a 1%
signiﬁcance level they start to reject only after the 25th quarter and the share rises
29We simulated the test 100 times. In each simulation we have 50 ﬁrms and the share reported
is the average fraction that rejects the null among simulations.



















Figure 3: Rejection rate (%) for the null ¯ p∗ =1 .11 with signiﬁcance level of 1%
(solid line) and 5% (dashed line).
only up to 40% in the 61st quarter, whereas in the case of the larger critical region
which corresponds to a 5% signiﬁcance level the share is just 25% in the 20th
quarter and rises to 65% in the 61st quarter. So despite the considerable amount
of overconﬁdence, the share of statisticians that would detect overconﬁdence is
practically very low.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have studied the behavior of individual and aggregate prices in
a model with monopolistic-competitive ﬁrms in an economy that is driven by a
hidden state process which is observed with noise. The subjective observation of
each ﬁrm is not common knowledge to all ﬁrms. Moreover, we have assumed that
32this subjective observation is not rational since ﬁrms are overconﬁdent and believe
that their perceptions are a better representation of the hidden state than they are
in reality.
This model can rationalize a persistent response of output to a perturbation to
the aggregate hidden state and be consistent at the same time with excess volatility
of individual prices since ﬁrms pay a lot of attention to their subjective percep-
tions which include the underestimated noisy component. In our model, ﬁrms
can in principle choose to discover reality, but their overconﬁdence prevents them
from doing so. This irrational inattention model has then be used to match recent
empirical evidence on the behavior of disaggregated prices in the US economy with-
out necessarily assuming high volatility of fundamental aggregate or idiosyncratic
shocks.
There are several important assumptions in our stylized framework. Among
t h e s ei st h ef a c tt h a td e c i s i o n m a k e r sk n o w( b u td on o to b s e r v e )t h et r u es t r u c t u r e
of the model. What will happen when they doubt which model is going to be
unveiled once the noise disappears is the question we leave open for future research.
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36Appendix
Derivation of condition (3.12) from (2.11).
We ﬁrst note that by using condition (1.7) we can rewrite marginal costs in
terms of the complete information price and by using also condition (2.10) we
can express the expected proﬁts as functions of P†(j) and ˜ P (j) and the variable




















We take a second order approximation of expected proﬁts around a determin-
istic steady state where θ = ¯ θ and as a result P = P† = ˜ P ≡ ¯ P.L e t l o w e r c a s e
variables denote log-deviations from the steady state and let kpk and kzk denote a
b o u n do nt h es i z eo fﬂuctuations for the price of each diﬀerentiated good and for



































Similarly by approximating equation (A.2) we obtain that
E























Note that ¯ P1−ε ¯ Z =
¯ M
¯ P = ¯ Y and let
W (j) ≡ π(P
†(j),P,θ) − π( ˜ P(j),P,θ)





































Furthermore, if we take a second-order approximation of it we obtain

















where Va r j(p†) ≡ Ej(p†)2 −(Ejp†)2. Using (A.6) and (A.7) into (A.5) we observe
that the terms involving z cancel out and that Ej(p†2 − ˜ p(j))2 = Va r j(p†),s o
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where cj ≡ 2
¯ Y (ε−1)˜ cj which is expression (3.12) in the text. In the text, we also
denote with lower-case letters the logs of the respective variable.
Note that exactly the same calculations apply in the dynamic case, where each
variable is indexed with t. In this case the expected diﬀerence of proﬁts at time t,





t (j),P t,θt) − π( ˜ Pt(j),P t,θt)} =
¯ Y
2





in a second-order approximation, where the expectation operator is conditional on




t) corresponds to the
subjective contemporaneous variance of p
†
t.
Derivations of (5.35) and (5.36).
We proceed using the method developed in Woodford (2002). We claim that







38and guess that it evolves according to a linear law of motion


















are vectors and matrices to be determined. Note that our variables of interest are
the prices of the informed ﬁrms which can be written as p† =¯ η0Xt and that of the
uninformed which can be written as ˜ pt (i)=¯ η0Ei
tXt,w h e r e¯ η0 =( η,1 − η).
Let e1 =( 1 ,0)
0. We can write the following system








where the second line corresponds to the observational equation. We proceed
assuming a stationary ﬁltering problem. The ﬁltering equation of a generic unin-












where K is the vector of Kalman gains pre-multiplied with M−1.U s i n g( A . 8 )w e
obtain that E
j





t =¯ p∗ + ρE
j
t−1p∗














Aggregating among all agents j that are uninformed and guessing that in equilib-
rium µ will be non-random (as in the static case) we obtain




t − ¯ p














which is the law of motion of the average estimate, where we have used the law of
large numbers.
Our target is to express the price level pt in terms of Xt−1. The general price










+( 1− δ) ¯ Etpt
=( δµ,1 − δ) ¯ EtXt + δ(1 − µ)p
∗
t








Using the law of motion (A.10) to substitute for ¯ EtXt and collecting terms we have
pt =[ ( δµ,1 − δ)f + δ(1 − µ)¯ p
∗]+ρ
£




t−1 +( δµ,1 − δ)M ¯ Et−1Xt−1




δ(1 − µ)+ ¯ K
¤
ut,
where ¯ K ≡ (δµ,1 − δ)K.F i n a l l y , u s i n g t h e d e ﬁnition of M and ¯ Et−1Xt−1 and
noting that
(δµ,1 − δ)f + δ(1 − µ)¯ p
∗ = δ¯ p
∗ +( 1− δ)¯ p
we obtain that
pt = δ¯ p
∗ +( 1− δ)¯ p + ρ
£










+(1− δ)b ¯ Et−1pt−1 +
£




pt−1 = δµ ¯ Et−1p
∗
t−1 +( 1− δ) ¯ Et−1pt−1 + δ(1 − µ)p
∗
t−1,
we can use this expression to substitute for ¯ Et−1pt−1 in (A.11) and arrive at
pt = δ¯ p
∗ +( 1− δ)¯ p +
£













δ(1 − µ)+ ¯ K
¤
ut. (A.12)
We note that (A.8) implies
pt =¯ p + ap
∗
t−1 + bpt−1 + cut. (A.13)
We can then match the coeﬃcients between (A.12) and (A.13) and obtain
δ¯ p
∗ +( 1− δ)¯ p =¯ p
δ(1 − µ)(ρ − b)+ρ ¯ K = a
δµ(ρ − b)+( 1− δ)a − ρ ¯ K =0
δ(1 − µ)+ ¯ K = c.
40Solving this system and using the deﬁnition of ¯ K =( δµ,1 − δ)K,w eg e t





¯ K = ρ¯ η
0K = ρˆ k
since η = δµ/(δµ +1− δ) and ˆ k ≡ ¯ η0K.M o r e o v e r
b = ρ − a = ρ
³
1 − ˆ k
´
and
c =( δµ +1− δ)ˆ k + δ(1 − µ).









where Σ i st h ev a r i a n c eo ft h eo n es t e pa h e a df o r e c a s te r r o rw h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the
















Thus in our guess-and-verify approach we expressed M and m as a function of ˆ k
which depends on the vector of Kalman gains K w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n d so nΣ.B u t
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u. From the lower left block of the Riccatti we derive
σ12 =
ρ2ˆ kσ11¯ σ2
ξ +( σ11 +¯ σ2
ξ)
h
(δµ +1− δ)ˆ kσ2








41and -using (A.14)- we obtain










This is a system of two equations in the two unknowns (σ12,ˆ k). Solving the system









¤ˆ k − δ =0 . (A.16)
The discriminant of (A.16) is positive, so there are two real roots. Furthermore,
since Q(0) < 0 and Q(1) = ¯ λ > 0, one is negative and the other positive and less
than unity. Note that subtracting pt from p∗
t we get an expression for the output
deviation
yt = ρ(1 − ˆ k)yt−1 +( 1− c)ut,
since p∗
t +l n¯ Y =l n Mt = pt +l nYt. In order to have a stationary solution for
output we need
¯ ¯ ¯1 − ˆ k
¯ ¯ ¯ < |ρ|
−1.I t f o l l o w s t h a t ˆ k should satisfy the restriction
1 − ρ−1 < ˆ k<1+ρ−1. Since Q(1 − ρ−1)=−ρ−1 ¡
(ρ − 1)
2 λ + δ
¢
< 0, only the























Having solved for the laws of motion of Xt and E
j
tXt,w ec a nd e r i v et h el a w s
of motion of the prices of interest p† =¯ η0Xt and ˜ pt (j)=¯ η0E
j
tXt and obtain















t = ρ(1 − ˆ k)q
j
t−1 + δ(1 − ˆ k)ut − ˆ kξ
j
t. (A.17)



























t =0 . Calculating variances conditional on the private history
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t), where the last step follows
from the non-randomness of the variances of the ﬁlter. The expression in the text
for the contemporaneous variance follows by using the stationarity of the ﬁlter and
t h ef a c tt h a t( A . 1 6 )i m p l i e sδ(1 − ˆ k)=¯ λˆ k[1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)].
Derivations of (5.39).
We will now proceed to derive the condition for excess volatility of the prices
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t, ˜ pt(j)) = cov(q
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t, ˜ pt (j)) < 0.N o t et h a t
cov(q
j
t, ˜ pt (j)) =
1
1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)2[ρ




t−1)+δ(1 − ˆ k)ˆ kσ
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Using the law of motion for the full information price and q
j






δ(1 − ˆ k)σ2
u
1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)
and plugging it in the previous expression we ﬁnally obtain
cov(q
j
t, ˜ pt(j)) =
1
1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)2
"
δ(1 − ˆ k)ˆ k
1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)
σ
2









1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)2
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δ(1 − ˆ k)
ˆ k
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In order to have I<0,w en e e d
δ(1 − ˆ k)
ˆ k
"




1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)
#
− λ < 0.
Using as before the fact that δ(1 − ˆ k)=¯ λˆ k[1 − ρ2(1 − ˆ k)] we derive the condition
(5.39).
Calibration of the information costs.
We convert the lifetime costs to costs per period by multiplying it by the factor

















j (1 − β) ≤ c

































Given our assumption of a uniform distribution for the costs as a fraction of steady












where U(·) is the corresponding c.d.f. This equation gives the implicit equation
(6.42).
44